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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. BEAN, Administrator of the 
Estate of Alice A. M. Carlos, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARCHIE T. CARLOS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
VERA EMELINE HOLLIST, MARY 
ALICE CARLOS and GLENN GREEN, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 10899 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court 
denying defendant's motion to vacate a judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied defendant's motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's order 
denying the motion. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's Statement of Facts is largely irrelevant 
and is argumentative. It deals with the merits of the cause 
of action sued on, and hence with matters not properly be-
fore the court. Plaintiff submits the following: 
Plaintiff filed suit in the court below alleging that an 
attempted property transfer was testamentary in nature, 
and therefore in violation of the statutes governing wills. 
Plaintiff further alleged that the scheme was effected as a 
result of undue influence on the grantor-testatrix (R.1-5). 
Issue was joined (R.6,7,13-21), discovery was made (R.8-
12), pre-trial was had (R.25-27) and the case came on for 
trial on August 4, 1965 (R.38). After one-half day of trial, 
the parties agreed on a compromise settlement, and the same 
was stated into the record. 
Plaintiff's counsel prepared a written stipulation (Def's 
Exh. 1, Hearing of April 19, 1966) which was sent to defend-
ant's counsel for signature, but defendant refused to sign it. 
Defendant then submitted a claim in the estate matter, and 
his claim was denied. (Probate File No. 172~). Defendant 
then discharged his attorney and hired present counsel. 
On April 12, 1966, defendant's present counsel filed a 
motion to vacate the judgment. Hearing was had on the 
motion on April 19, 1966, and on March 23, 1967, the court 
denied the motion. Defendant appeals from the denial. 
All references to the transcript, unless otherwise stated, 
mean the transcript of the second hearing, April'l9, 1966. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION TO VA CATE JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
The defendant's motion to vacate the judgment entered 
was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
that court's denial of defendant's motion should be affirmed 
unless an abuse of such discretion is clearly shown. Warren 
1.'. Dixon Ranch Company, 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), 
Haner v. Haner, 13 U.2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962). In the 
Haner case this court said : 
It is the purpose of the law to afford the parties full 
opportunity to have themselves and their witnesses 
present; and to present their evidence and their con-
tentions to the court. When this has been done and 
the court has made its determination, that should end 
the matter, except for the right of appeal. It is so 
patent as to hardly justify comment that a judgment 
should not be set aside merely to grant the losing 
party another chance to accomplish the task at which 
he just failed: to prove that he was right and that the 
opponent was wrong. To reopen a case just because 
a party persists in asserting and attempting to prove 
that his version of the dispute was the truth and that 
of the opponent was false would open the door to a 
repetition of that procedure, whoever won the next 
time; and thus to keeping the dispute going ad in-
finitum with no way of determining when the merry-
go-round of the lawsuit would end. 
Fraud was alleged in the Haner case, and the same 
allegation has been made by defendant here, though not so 
denominated. Defendant claims he did not consent to a 
compromise made in open court, but if he didn't, then the 
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attorneys and the court perpetrated a fraud. Possibly de-
fendant's reason for not so naming it is the higher burden of 
proof required, and this would be a problem for defendant 
in light of the quality of his proof. 
Excerpts from the transcripts of the two hearings are 
appropriate at this point to focus attention on just what the 
trial judge had before him in considering defendant's mo-
tion. The court is referred to the transcript of the afternoon 
session of the August 4, 1965, hearing, pages 43 to 48. This 
is set out correctly in defendant's brief, and there is no need 
to repeat it here. It shows that defendant was present when 
the settlement was stated into the record, that his attorney 
was present and participated in the framing of the terms, 
and that the trial judge specifically addressed a question to 
defendant and defendant said he "guessed" he understood it, 
and neither defendant nor his counsel raised any objection 
or question as to any part of the compromise except the 
moving of the silo, and that was settled before completion 
of the discussion. 
Set over against that, are the affidavit and testimony 
on direct examination of defendant Archie Carlos in support 
of his motion to vacate. He said he never stipulated to a 
judgment against him for $5,000.00 (R.42) ; that he didn't 
know, when at court on August 4, 1965, that the case had 
been settled ( T .4, L.25) ; that he didn't authorize Mr. Judd, 
who had been his attorney for five years, to and including 
the time of the trial, to stipulate for settlement of the contro-
versy (T.5, L.6) ; that he didn't participate in a meeting for 
a discussion of settlement (T.5, L.11), and that he didn't 
know what a stipulation was (T.5, L.20). 
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However, on cross examination he admitted: 
That he'd had four lawyers represent him on this case 
(T.19, L.24). 
That his second lawyer had also counseled him to settle 
the case (T.10, L.23). 
That Mr. Judd had been his lawyer and had represented 
him from sometime in 1960 until March (or perhaps 
February) of 1966 (T.12, L.8). 
That he sat in court and listened to the proceedings on 
August 4, 1965 (T.12, L.25). 
That he sat on the first row of the courtroom seats 
(T.12, L.30; T.13, L.1-6). 
That his hearing was good enough to hear what went 
on (T.13, L.9). 
That he knew what was being done (T.13, L.11). 
That he knew that Mr. Judd was agreeing in defen-
dant's behalf that defendant would pay $5,000.00 (T.14, 
L.7,28). 
'l'hat he did some talking himself when the stipulation 
was stated for the record (T.15, L.11), and no one kept him 
from saying what he wanted to say (T.15, L.24). 
That he raised a question as to a silo, but didn't question 
anything else about the settlement (T.16, L.13; T.23, L.19). 
6 
That when he said "I don't go much for that," he meant 
he didn't go much for moving the silo (T.17, L.5-12). 
That his prior lawyer had advised him of the thirty-day 
appeal time (T.19, L.3-10), but he did not instruct his 
lawyer to file an appeal (T.19, L.13). 
That his fourth lawyer told him there might be a means 
of appealing the case (T.19, L.28). 
That counsel and their clients spent most of the after-
noon at the hearing on August 4, 1965, working out the 
settlement (T.22, L.23). 
That all the details were worked out about use of the 
silo and the moving of it (T.23, L.4). 
That he had come to court on August 4, 1965, prepared 
to put in evidence in support of a claim that he had spent 
money in his mother's behalf and in protection of or im-
provement of her property, and that those same expendi-
tures were the subject of the claim he later filed in the 
probate matter (T.27, L.8-28). 
And that the settlement disposed of any claim he had 
against the estate ( T .28, L.3). 
• 
It is the defendant's own testimony which knocks the 
props out from under his claim. The foregoing answers on 
cross-examination lead to but one conclusion: That the testi-
mony of defendant and his wife at the second hearing to the 
effect that defendant did not authorize the stipulation made 
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by his lawyer at the first hearing, is wholly unworthy of 
belief. His claim of no authority is rather incredible. In spite 
of what the record shows, he asks this court to hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion, even 
though his present claim flies squarely in the face of every-
thing the trial court saw and heard at the first hearing. He 
has no explanation for the fact that after lengthy negotia-
tions, it was stipulated by his attorney that he would pay 
$5,000.00 to plaintiff and waive all claim to anything from 
the estate. He has no explanation for the fact that he ex-
pressed no objection to anything at the time that stipulation 
was made, except to the moving of a silo, and even acquiesced 
to that after the details were worked out. 
The defendant, Archie Carlos, is not exactly a shrinking 
violet. If his attorney was "selling him down the river," why 
didn't he stand up and say so in court? Does he want us to 
believe that the courtroom was the Star Chamber rather 
than an American court of law? Why did his wife sit silent? 
Why didn't they both repudiate the attorney's agreements, 
and denounce him as a fraud? Why didn't the defendant 
deny, then and there, his attorney's authority to make the 
settlement? Why did defendant wait eight and one-half 
months, until after his claim was rejected in the probate 
matter, before filing this motion to vacate the judgment? 
Defendant didn't return the written stipulation with a 
complaint that it didn't agree with the terms stipulated into 
the record at court. His refusal was a flat refusal to per-
form, in any manner whatsoever, the agreement there made. 
He was going to go right ahead just as if there had been no 
suit and no compromise at court. After the entry of findings 
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of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, he made no 
motion to amend or correct these pleadings so as to make 
them conform, and made no claim that they did not truly 
reflect the agreement made in open court. 
The fact is that the evidence that morning of August 4, 
1965, began to look bad for defendant's position, and his 
attorney knew somewhat of the further evidence yet to come 
in. So, upon his attorney's advice, he agreed to a settlement 
which provided, among other things, that he should pay 
$5,000.00 to plaintiff. And he's had enough education to 
know what it means to pay $5,000.00. But doubtless the 
thought rankled him after he had slept on it, and when it 
came right down to time to pay up, he rebelled and refused 
to sign the written stipulation and instead filed a claim 
against the estate. When that was denied, he told his 
attorney to appeal the case, but by then his appeal rights 
had long ago run out. So he discharged his lawyer, retained 
other counsel, and tried an appeal by the present method. 
That this is an attempt to appeal from the judgment 
entered four months earlier seems to be borne out by the 
statement of facts and part of the argument in defendant's 
brief. These deal at length with the facts and law of the 
case on its merits, and such are not properly before the 
court on this appeal. The sole question, pertinent here, is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion to vacate the judgment. Only that denial is in ques-
tion here. 
Worth noting at this point is the objectionable proced-
ure followed in defendant's attempt to support the instant 
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motion. Plaintiff is aware of the provisions of Rule 43 ( e), 
U.R.C.P., that the court may hear oral testimony in support 
of a motion, but believes that such testimony must be rele-
vant to the grounds set forth in the motion itself. Such is the 
requirement of Rule 7 (b) ( 1), i.e., that the grounds of the 
motion shall be stated with particularity. Here, defendant's 
motion sets forth four alleged grounds: (1) Inconsistency, 
(2) no supporting pleadings, (3) no (written) stipulation, 
and (4) no authority from the probate court. Defendant's 
affidavit in support of the motion recites only that he never 
made an oral stipulation and never signed the written one, 
and so advised his attorney. But his testimony, elicited on 
direct examination, dealt particularly with his vrior lawyer's 
authority to make the settlement agreement in open court 
in defendant's behalf. That is a horse of another color, and 
plaintiff had no opportunity to meet that testimony. It was 
not relevant to the grounds set forth in the motion itself, 
was objected to and should not have been admitted. Rule 
6 ( d) requires five days' notice before the hearing of the 
motion, but this is meaningless if the moving party can shift 
to a different ground at the time of the hearing. 
Defendant claims he never authorized an oral stipula-
tion in open court, but says that if he did it's not binding on 
him because the parties contemplated a written stipulation. 
They certainly did, because it was necessary that the bank 
account be more specifically identified and that the metes 
and bounds descriptions and other references to affected 
realty be determined. But that was the only purpose of the 
written stipulation, and there was nothing tenuous or con-
ditional about the oral stipulation. It was final, complete, 
and agreed to by everyone present in court, including Archie 
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and his counsel. As a result of it, the trial was stopped, 
subpoened witnesses were released from their obligation, 
trial strategies theretofore undisclosed were freely discussed, 
part of the property was surveyed, and money was paid by 
some of the defendants. To allow Archie now to repudiate 
his settlement would be to allow him to perpetrate a fraud. 
It would mean that a litigant who senses a trial may be 
going badly can stop it in the middle, agree in open court to 
a compromise, then repudiate the compromise, fall back and 
regroup his forces, discharge his lawyer, retain a new one, 
and have another run at it. Such conduct and procedure has 
never been countenanced, for reasons founded on estoppel 
if for none other, and it should not be countenanced now. 
Defendant's brief frequently refers to "uncontradicted" 
testimony. Uncontradicted by what? On cross-examination, 
Archie contradicted himself rather badly. All of the prior 
proceedings contradict him. Reason and logic contradict him. 
In short, his self-serving testimony elucidates nothing. 
POINT II 
THE STIPULATION DIDN'T HAVE TO BE AUTHOR 
IZED BY THE PROBATE COURT. 
Archie and the other children of Alice A. M. Carlos, 
deceased, were the record owners of her real estate. Deeds 
delivered more than ninety days after her death had been 
recorded in their names. The administrator owned nothing, 
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and it was incumbent on him to bring suit to recover the 
real estate. Unless he prevailed in the suit, there was nothing 
to account for in the estate matter. 
Defendant's reasoning in Part 2 of his brief is fallacious. 
Since the administrator owned no real estate, there didn't 
have to be any conveyance by him, and hence no confirma-
tion of sale. The reason for quit-claim deeds referred to in 
the stipulation discussion at the first hearing is that plain-
tiff had recorded a !is pendens and a title insuring organiza-
tion might want a quit-claim deed rather than a mere release 
of the lis pendens. 
Sec. 75-11-12, UCA 1953, relied on by defendant, is 
inapplicable. Its provisions clearly refer to compromises of 
acknowledged debts where there is no dispute of the exist-
ence or justice of the debt, but the debtor cannot pay all his 
debts, and in such cases the executor or administrator may 
enter into a composition with the defendant and the other 
creditors. 
But in any event, defendant is premature in his com-
plaint. He repudiated the settlement and the administrator 
now has nothing to get approval of. If defendant will 
perform, plaintiff will account to the probate court and get 
the accounting approved. 
And finally, Archie has no standing to complain about 
what is done in the probate matter since he waived any 
claim to the estate property as part of the compromise. 
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POINT III 
THE PROBATE COURT DIRECTED PROSECUTION OF 
THIS SUIT. 
Since the printing and filing of appellant's brief, the 
record in the probate file has been corrected by order of the 
District Court, so as to reflect that which occurred on 
November 19, 1963, upon the hearing of a motion brought 
by Archie Carlos to revoke letters of administration issued 
by David E. Bean. The court denied the motion and directed 
the administrator to proceed with all expediency to a hear-
ing of the case. Defendant's argument that the stipulation 
amounted to the distribution of an estate is false and about 
the only reply that can be made has already been made, i.e., 
that if Archie will perform his agreements under the com-
promise settlement, then the assets of the estate can be 
accounted for to the court and the other requirements of the 
probate code can be met and the assets distributed in accord-
ance with that code. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION IS FULLY SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE. 
Matters raised in Point IV of defendant's brief are 
mostly a restatement of points raised elsewhere in his brief. 
One contention, however, seems to be that since Archie and 
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his wife were the only witnesses who testified at the second 
hearing, the trial court was compelled to believe their testi-
mony. The law is clearly to the contrary. In re Richards' 
Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956). 
No finder of fact is bound to believe any witness, and 
this is especially so where the testimony of that witness is 
inherently improbable as it was in this case. Judge Swan 
could and did find that the testimony of Archie and his wife 
at the second hearing was entitled to no weight, and he was 
at liberty to disregard it. He had been present when the 
whole matter was settled on August 4, 1965, and he was 
entitled to weigh all that transpired that day against 
Archie's testimony at the second hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is a presumption on appeal that the findings 
and judgment of the trial court are correct, appellant must 
sustain the burden of demonstration to the contrary if he 
is to prevail. In addition, the facts on appeal are viewed in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
Citizens Casualty Co. of New York v. Hackett, 17 U.2d 304, 
410 P.2d 767 (1966), Ortega v. Thomas, 14 U.2d 296, 383 
P.2d 406 (1963). Appellant has not sustained his burden. 
Archie Carlos had his day in court. He was represented 
by able and resourceful counsel. He stipulated to a com-
promise settlement in the course of trial, but when it came to 
the formal entry of the judgment, he reversed himself and 
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refused to perform. Such duplicity should be neither en-
couraged nor tolerated, and the judgment entered pursuant 
to the stipulation should be upheld. The order of the trial 
court denying defendant's motion to vacate the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. ROGER BEAN 
Bean and Bean 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
